

Department of Homeland Security
Office of Infrastructure Protection
Field Operations Instruction
Revision Number: 04
Issue Date: 6 Jan 2014

2013 Energy Subsector Outreach

Background: On 18 April 2013, unknown actors breached a fence at the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) electrical substation located near Metcalf Road in San Jose, CA. The attackers breached the facility fence line, and shot and damage five transformers. A simultaneous disruption in the Santa Clara County 911 system and AT&T phone communications in the area was subsequently determined to be the result of severed fiber optic cables in a nearby manhole, which are believed to have been cut by the substation assailants.

I. Situation. In response to this and other recent incidents targeting the energy sector, the Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Office of Energy Infrastructure Security, the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC) partners, and industry experts, are conducting a series of briefings across the country for owners, operators, and local law enforcement. These briefings will provide an overview of the evolving threat, as well as an understanding of available tools, resources, and best practices designed to enhance information sharing, physical security, and resilience.

II. Mission. On 4 February and 18 March in New York City and Boston, respectively, Protective Security Advisors inform and educate owners, operators, and law enforcement professionals regarding electric substation security to enhance physical security, resilience, and information sharing.

Be prepared to brief public and private partners on vulnerability assessment tools available to owners and operators.

III. Execution.

(b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

Department of Homeland Security
Office of Infrastructure Protection
Field Operations Instruction
Revision Number: 04
Issue Date: 6 Jan 2014

2013 Energy Subsector Outreach

(b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

C. Tasks.

(b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

Department of Homeland Security
Office of Infrastructure Protection
Field Operations Instruction
Revision Number: 04
Issue Date: 6 Jan 2014

2013 Energy Subsector Outreach

(b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

IV. Administration and Logistics.

A. Presentations and Leave Behind Materials. This FOI along with all attachments and leave behind materials can be found on the FOB SharePoint outreach page under the “Electrical Substation Outreach” folder (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(F)

1. PSA Security Briefing slide presentation.
2. Leave behind materials and Resource Page.
 - a. “If You See Something, Say Something™”
 - b. Fact Sheet: Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI)
 - c. Fact Sheet: Suspicious Activity Reporting
 - d. Fact Sheet: Office for Bombing Prevention Training and course schedule

Department of Homeland Security
Office of Infrastructure Protection
Field Operations Instruction
Revision Number: 04
Issue Date: 6 Jan 2014

2013 Energy Subsector Outreach

e. Fact Sheet: Office for Bombing Prevention TRIPwire Community Gateway

f. Fact Sheet: Office for Bombing Prevention MJIEDSOPD Resource Page

B. Information Classification and Release.

1. All information within this outreach is unclassified.

2. PSAs are not authorized to discuss this outreach with any media; PSAs should forward all media requests to the DHS Office of Public Affairs, reachable at 202-282-8010.

V. Collaboration and Communication.

A. Communication Plan.

1. PSCD/FOB Operations Coordinator for this outreach activity is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

2. PSCD Operations will serve as the single point for PSA Program coordination and de-confliction. All RFIs/RFAs and email communication associated with this initiative will be routed through (b) (6), (b) (7)(E)

B. Collaborative Relationships. DOE is the lead agency for the Substation Outreach. PSAs should expect contact from their local field office, but should initiate contact if none has occurred by 10 January.

C. Point of contact for this Field Operating Instruction is Program Analyst (b) (6)

Warning Order

Energy Substation Outreach

December 2013—March 2014

Background: On 18 April 2013, unknown individuals breached an electrical substation IVO Metcalf, CA and damaged five generators using small arms and cut fiber optic cable. In response, DHS, DOE, FBI, FERC, and ES-ISAC have partnered to conduct information and best practices sharing regarding substation security.

Mission: Protective Security Advisors will inform and educate owners, operators, and local law enforcement professionals regarding electric substation security to enhance physical security, resilience, and information sharing.

HQ PSAs will provide a brief (5-10 minutes) that addresses ECIP/IST Vulnerability Assessments, training resources available through OBP and SOPD, and IP information sharing programs.

All briefs for the outreach can be found here:

(b) (7)(E)

Field PSAs will invite local law enforcement professionals and coordinate for their attendance. Field PSAs will also participate in a panel discussion led by SOPD that will include representatives from DOE, FBI, and the private sector.

Initial Coordinating Instructions as follows:

a. Chicago, IL. Exelon will host the outreach on 14 January at the Palmer House Hilton located at 17 E. Monroe, Chicago, IL 60603, in the Red Lacquer Room. Point of contact (b) (6)

Registration link:

(b) (7)(E)

b. Denver, CO. Xcel Energy will host the outreach on 16 January at 1800 Larimer, Denver CO 80202 on the second floor in conference room E. Point of contact is (b) (6)

Registration link:

(b) (7)(E)

c. Tampa Bay, FL. Tampa Electric Co. will host the outreach on 21 January in The Vault located at 611 N. Franklin St. Tampa, FL 33602. Point of contact is (b) (6)

Registration link:

(b) (7)(E)

d. Houston, TX. CenterPoint Energy will host the outreach on 23 January in the CenterPoint Auditorium located at 1111 Louisiana, Houston, TX 77002 on the first floor. Point of contact is (b) (6)

Warning Order
Energy Substation Outreach
December 2013—March 2014

Registration link:

(b) (6)

e. San Jose, CA. PG&E will host the outreach on 11 February at San Jose State University in the Barrett Ballroom located at One Washington Square, San Jose, CA 95192. Point of contact is (b) (6)

Register at

(b) (6)

f. Albuquerque, NM. PNM will host the outreach on 12 February at the Hyatt Regency Albuquerque located at 330 Tijeras NW, Albuquerque, NM 87102. Points of (b) (6)

Register at

(b) (7)(E)

g. Seattle, WA. Puget Sound Energy will host the outreach on 13 February in the Puget Sound Energy Auditorium located at 355 110th Ave NE, Bellevue, WA 98004. Point of contact is (b) (6)

Register at

(b) (7)(E)

h. Boston, MA. National Grid will host the outreach on 18 March at Gillette Stadium, 1 Patriot Place, Foxborough, MA, 02035. Point of contact is (b) (6)

Register at

(b) (7)(E)

i. New York City, NY. Consolidated Edison will host the outreach on 21 March in ConEd's auditorium at 4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003. Point of contact is (b) (6)

Register at

(b) (7)(E)

From: (b) (6)
To:
Cc:
Subject: FW: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California
Date: Wednesday, March 30, 2022 12:22:46 PM
Attachments: [EnergySubstationOutreach_FOI_Boston_NYC_9Jan14.docx](#)
[SubstationFollowOnECIP_WarnO_18Mar14.docx](#)
[EnergySubstationOutreach_WarnO_11Feb14.docx](#)

(b) (6) not sure if you want to send to (b) (6) . but the attached documents and below email traffic are the only materials related to Metcalf we could locate.

(b) (6) thanks for sending this along for consideration.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Chief, Assessments Section
Resilience Services Branch (RSB)
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2022 12:19 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

(b) (6)

Here is some email traffic and documents from Metcalf. We did an IST 02/02/2018 and a BZPP on 07/13/2005. All the other email traffic is spreadsheets on substations, no other post-products I can find.

(b) (6)
Security Specialist
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Cell: (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 12:46 PM
To: IAA Program Training Analysts <IAAPTAnalysts@cisa.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

FOBA,

I gathered the following excerpts from the FOIs that we used to communicate and task the

outreach to the PSAs; the first two paragraphs come from the first phase of the outreach where we visited 10 cities and presented information to as many facility/sector representatives as possible, and the second two come from the follow-on outreach where we offered ECIP visits to those responsible for critical substations:

Background: On 18 April 2013, unknown actors breached a fence at the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) electrical substation located near Metcalf Road in San Jose, CA. The attackers breached the facility fence line, and shot and damage five transformers. A simultaneous disruption in the Santa Clara County 911 system and AT&T phone communications in the area was subsequently determined to be the result of severed fiber optic cables in a nearby manhole, which are believed to have been cut by the substation assailants.

(b) (7)(E)

Follow On Actions: Following completion of the Electric Substation Outreach conducted from December 2013 to March 2014 in response to the coordinated attack on a substation in Metcalf, California, the Field Operations Branch has received tasking to contact the owners and operators of the 30 most critical electric substations across the country and offer to conduct an

(b) (7)(E)

The Metcalf incident and the substation outreach have raised concerns among the community of interest within the electricity subsector regarding the security of substations. Offering ECIP visits to the 30 most critical substations demonstrates the federal government's commitment to reducing the vulnerability of this infrastructure.

I've attached the documents for your reference, also. Please let me know if you need anything else or have any questions—happy to assist.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

Contingency Operations Analyst
Field Operations Branch
Protective Security Coordination Division
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 12:35 PM

To: FOBAAnalysts

Cc: (b) (6)

Subject: FW: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Importance: High

FOA,

Need a couple sentences on this today. Can you please work up a summary of the substation outreach, the final analytical report, and a few assessment statistics? Very quick write-up, all from existing material. (b) (6), please pitch in as necessary.

Thanks!

(b) (6)

DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection
Protective Security Coordination Division
(b) (6)



Save a tree, please don't print this e-mail unless you must.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 11:52 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Thanks.....can you have somebody draft something up to address the completion of the assessments at distribution/transmission substations and the report.....and who we continue to work with.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 11:06 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Re: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

We can speak to what we're doing in the sector in partnership with the private sector as a result of Metcalf and highlight our analytical product and assessment work. We could take the lead with the LE agencies (FBI/HSI) providing the status of investigations.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 10:52 AM
To: (b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Thoughts on how to respond. Basically our work has been related to monitoring the situation and coordinating with the local authorities for situational awareness.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 10:44 AM
To: (b) (6)

CS&C Legislative Affairs;

(b) (6)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Adding (b) (6) to see if he has any insight and can speak to his work with other agencies. Rep Eshoo is asking for DHS to go up as interagency (FBI, FCC) with DHS as lead.

BLUF:

Congresswoman Eshoo (D-CA-18TH) requests a Member-meeting with DHS, FBI and FCC to learn more about the cable cut that recently happened in Livermore, California which disrupted service to Sacramento.

Rep. Eshoo is concerned that there is a coordinated national security effort with all the pattern of cable cutting and wants to know what we are doing about it. This is a proposed member level meeting with the silicon valley congressional delegation to get a handle of how we the interagency are keeping on top of things like this.

Additionally, she was similarly concerned about the Metcalfe incident.

Link to article Rep Eshoo staffer referenced in request:

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/30/us-california-internet-attack-idUSKCN0PA32A20150630>

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 10:42 AM
To: (b) (6) CS&C Legislative Affairs
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California
(b) (5), (b) (6)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 10:32 AM
To: (b) (6) ; CS&C Legislative Affairs
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Re: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Do we need a discussion first abt whether we're going up just DHS or with interagency?

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 10:29 AM
To: (b) (6) CS&C Legislative Affairs
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

A/S Durkovich is available July 24 between 8-9am. Please let me know if DAS Touhill a (b) (6) schedule is open for this date and time so we can lock it on with the staffer.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 2:15 PM
To: (b) (6) CS&C Legislative Affairs
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Also looping in (b) (6), OLA for IP.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 2:14 PM
To: (b) (6) CS&C Legislative Affairs
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Looping in (b) (6) from IP. Per (b) (6) guidance, he's checking with his folks to see if they're going to take lead like last time.

If not, then we may press forward with the DAS.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 1:56 PM
To: (b) (6) CS&C Legislative Affairs
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Good Afternoon,

DAS Touhill is available Friday, July 24th from 8 a.m.-9 a.m. He is **not available Wednesday, the 29th of July.**

V/r,

(b) (6)

Executive Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary Brigadier General Gregory Touhill (USAF ret.)
SAVVEE Consulting, Inc.
Supporting Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 1:24 PM
To: (b) (6) ; CS&C Legislative Affairs
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Sure! Whatever works. I was just answering because I saw it hadn't been answered yet.

If they do lead, do you want me to still see (b) (6) wants to go in and provide his two cents?

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 12:59 PM
To: (b) (6) CS&C Legislative Affairs
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: Re: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

In the past IP has led this.

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 12:28 PM
To: (b) (6) CS&C Legislative Affairs
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

I recommend a Touhill/ (b) (6) tag team on this.

Looping in (b) (6) to figure out availability.

Per the earlier email, these are two times that could work for the member:

Friday, July 24 – 8-9

Wednesday, July 29 – 8-9

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 12:22 PM
To: CS&C Legislative Affairs
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: FW: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

I need some help getting this settled.

Congresswoman Eshoo is a very important member that brings a lot of votes to the table, and also represents silicon valley.

She can be demanding, and difficult if she doesn't feel she is accommodated.

Let me know if we are able to adjudicate something through either a referral (I was thinking of kicking this off to FBI, or NSC and letting them handle), but want to get them a response asap.

From: (b) (6) (Eshoo) (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 10:32 AM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

I should mention that we have Member interest from others in the Bay Area. Specifically, Rep. Lofgren has indicated that she wants to attend this meeting. I would expect us to invite other Members as well.

From: (b) (6) (Eshoo)
Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 3:58 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Here are two possible time frames that would work for my boss:

Friday, July 24 – 8-9

Wednesday, July 29 – 8-9

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 3:38 PM
To: (b) (6) (Eshoo)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

Sorry for missing your call. Running this down.

From: (b) (6) (Eshoo) (b) (6)
Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 1:36 PM
To: (b) (6)
Subject: RE: FBI investigating new fiber cable attack in California

(b) (6) my boss is looking to set up a Member-meeting with DHS, FBI and FCC to learn more about this. Who would be the best person to work with over at DHS to coordinate?

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/30/us-california-internet-attack-idUSKCN0PA32A20150630>

From: (b)(6)
To:
Subject: IP Update for the Week of September 29
Date: Saturday, October 4, 2014 9:39:00 AM

IP Colleagues,

- Chicago Threat Briefing
- Asymmetric Threat Symposium
- PCII Awareness Briefings
- Incident Management Engagement Plan
- Nuts & Bolts

Chicago Threat Briefing

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and I had the privilege of joining I&A Deputy Under Secretary Jennifer Lasley in Chicago on Wednesday to brief Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel on the evolving threat environment and threats to critical infrastructure. I focused on the same topics <http://nppd-sp.dhs.gov/ip2/home/The_IP_Exchange/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=309%3e> that I covered with Governors Cuomo and Christie: improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small scale and active shooter attacks, low-tech kinetic attacks on infrastructure like the Metcalf substation, and the weaponization of high-risk chemical facilities and the chemicals they store. I also touched upon the risk posed by explosive precursors and other commonly available components and the need to raise awareness about their use in constru

From: (b)(6)
To:
Subject: IP Update: the week that was, we do what we do
Date: Friday, April 17, 2015 6:15:16 PM
Attachments: @

IP Colleagues -

You've heard me talk about the "week that was" in 2013.

- April 15: The Boston Marathon bombings and subsequent shootings killed 3 people and injured an estimated 264 others.
- April 16: The Metcalf fiber cut and ballistic attack on a Metcalf Transmission Substation located outside of San Jose, California resulting in over \$15 million worth of damage.
- April 17: An ammonium nitrate explosion at the West Fertilizer Company storage and distribution facility in West, Texas killed fifteen people, injured more than 160 people, and damaged or destroyed more than 150 buildings.

As you take a moment to remember these events, recall too that April 19 marks the 20th anniversary of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City that claimed the lives of 168 men, women and children and altered forever the lives of countless other survivors and rescue workers. All of these incidents are the reasons we dedicate ourselves to public service. We

Warning Order
Electric Substation Follow On Action
18 March—1 April 2014

Background: Following completion of the Electric Substation Outreach conducted from December 2013 to March 2014 in response to the coordinated attack on a substation in Metcalf, California, the Field Operations Branch has received tasking to contact the owners and operators of the 30 most critical electric substations across the country and offer to conduct an Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) Visit to assess these sites using the Infrastructure Survey Tool (IST).

Mission: No later than 1 April, Protective Security Advisors will contact the three most critical substations within their region, extend the offer to conduct an ECIP visit using the IST, and report to headquarters the status of the offer as a way of providing resources to the energy sector complementing the current outreach efforts.

Strategic Intent: The Metcalf incident and the substation outreach have raised concerns among the community of interest within the electricity subsector regarding the security of substations. Offering ECIP visits to the 30 most critical substations demonstrates the federal government's commitment to reducing the vulnerability of this infrastructure.

Coordinating Instructions and Tasks: PSAs will identify the three most critical substations within their region, initiate contact with the owners and operators, extend the offer to conduct an ECIP visit including use of the IST, and track whether owners and operators either accept or reject the offer.

PSAs should submit the results to (b) (7)(E) using the following format:

PSA and Region:

Substation Owned and Operated By:

Substation Location:

ECIP Offer Accepted:

Date of Scheduled ECIP:

Remarks: